By Edward Mortimer
Tony Blair is credited with making peace in Northern Ireland. We do not know yet whether he really has, but his success in forging the Good Friday agreement has given him, at least momentarily, a world aura as a peacemaker.
But his spin-doctors chose the wrong testing ground for this new-found reputation. In the Arab-Israel conflict, a British prime minister, even vested in the temporary grandeur of the European Union presidency, has very little leverage. Nearby, however, lies another long-entrenched conflict in which the EU has a direct, perhaps decisive role, while the UK has specific treaty responsibilities.
I refer to Cyprus, where even Richard Holbrooke, architect of Bosnia's Dayton accords, failed to break the deadlock last weekend. Mr. Holbrooke, now US special envoy to Cyprus, described the setback as a "temporary but serious impasse".
Serious it is. But to call it temporary must have taken all of his legendary can-do spirit. Deadlock has prevailed since Turkish troops occupied the northern two-fifths of the island in 1974, regrouping the Turkish Cypriot population there while driving the Greek Cypriots out.
Agreement in principle on a "bi-zonal, bi-communal federation" was reached as long ago as 1977, but repeated efforts by the United Nations to translate this into a new constitution have failed. The main obstacle has been the determination of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, to win equal status with the Greek Cypriots by getting the world to recognise his Turkish-protected de facto state in the north of the island. The Greek Cypriots, meanwhile, insist on a workable federal government reflecting their preponderance in the population (roughly 80 per cent), on freedom to reside in any part of the island, and on the withdrawal of Turkish troops.
Three years ago the EU sought to break this logjam by including Cyprus in its next wave of members. This was done to purchase Greek consent to a customs union between the EU and Turkey, but it was also hoped that the prospect of EU membership would give both communities on the island an incentive to settle their differences. If Turkish Cypriots blocked a settlement they faced the risk of seeing Cyprus admitted to the EU under its present, purely Greek Cypriot government; and if Greek Cypriots appeared intransigent they risked forfeiting the prize of entry.
It has not worked. Mr.Denktash has hardened his position, imposing two conditions for further talks that, as Mr.Holbrooke says, make progress "extremely difficult". One is that his state should first be recognised internationally, the other that the accession talks between Cyprus and the EU should be broken off.
Only Turkey has real leverage over Mr.Denktash- leverage it would have used, had things gone according to plan, to win west European good will and so smooth its own path to EU membership. Alas, at last December's Luxembourg summit the EU threw away this card by excluding Turkey from the "accession process" that has since been launched with 10 central and east European countries, as well as Cyprus. It also confirmed Turkey's "eligibility" for accession and proclaimed a "European strategy for Turkey". But this had a hollow ring for Turks, who saw themselves denied equal status even with countries deemed not yet ready for actual membership talks, such as Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia.
Since then Turkey has sought to punish the EU rather than placate it. Instead of encouraging Mr.Denktash to take up, or at least discuss, the EU's offer to include Turkish Cypriot representatives in the accession talks, it has backed him in breaking off the long-standing intercommunal talks on the Island's future.
"We believe", says Mr.Holbrooke (speaking for the US), "that Turkey's candidacy for EU membership should be considered on the same basis as other existing applicants, recognizing that such membership could take many years."
Indeed, the EU should recognise that only by giving Turkey equal treatment can it revive hopes of reuniting Cyprus as a single, albeit "bi-zonal" state. Turkey is simply not going to allow the whole of Cyprus, with its Turkish community, to be swept into an EU where Greece is a member but Turkey is not welcome.
If the EU persists with its present line, Cyprus will remain partitioned. The south with its Greek inhabitants will join, while the north with its Turkish inhabitants stays outside, whatever the text of the accession treaty may say.
In that case a different way of settling the conflict will have to be tried: the one long since accepted as the only possible basis for settling the Arab-Israel dispute, namely "land for peace". The Turkish Cypriot state, like the Jewish one, should be offered recognition of its right to exist, but on condition that it contents itself with the same share of the land that it has of the population - roughly half what it now occupies.
Peacemaker Blair, as EU president, should confront his fellow heads of government with a clear choice. He should tell them that, unless they use next month's Cardiff summit to correct the mistake they made at Luxembourg, he will feel obliged to convene a conference of the three guarantors of Cyprus's independence (Britain, Greece and Turkey) and to propose a new formula giving independence to both communities on the island, on separate but equal terms.