Prof.Dr.CIement Dodd
University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies

The most important recent event to affect the Cyprus issue has been the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999. This Helsinki summit accepted Turkey for the first time as a candidate for membership of the European Union on a par with the other twelve applicants. This was an important encouragement to Turkey's ambitions to be regarded as a truly European country, which was a major concern of Kemal Ataturk and has continued to be the aim of all those who would regard themselves as Atatiirkists. At the Luxembourg summit in December 1997 Turkey was placed in a special lower category of its own, below that of its ex-communist neighbours, Bulgaria and Romania, two of six states with whom the EU would start preparatory discussions for membership. To be left out in the cold was bad enough, to be told that future links with the EU depended on a number of reforms and on support for a settlement in Cyprus was regarded by Ankara as unacceptable.

It was obvious at Luxembourg that the EU had been influenced in its Opinion of the application of the Republic of Cyprus by the Report of its Observer, which reflected Greek Cypriot more than Turkish Cypriot points of view' It was particularly galling that at the Luxembourg summit the EU called for Cyprus negotiations on the basis of the Security Council resolutions, since most of them are unfavourable to the Turkish Cypriot side. Also the call for a response to be made to 'the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include Turkish Cypriots in the accession negotiations' would have amounted to Turkish Cypriot recognition of the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot Government as the Government of Cyprus. This had been pointed out on many occasions by Turkish Cypriot spokesmen, but seemed to be discounted altogether at the Luxembourg summit. Turkey refused thereafter to discuss Aegean or Cypriot affairs with the European Union.
Turkey was treated much more favourably in Helsinki but Turkey, along with all candidates, was urged 'to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues' (Para. 4). It was also stated that 'Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights as well as the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a)'. Paragraph 9(a) welcomed the beginning of the New York proximity talks on Cyprus starting 3 December and expressed its strong support for the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion. To a degree, therefore, Turkey is still held to be responsible for a settlement in Cyprus.

It was also made clear that whilst a settlement of the Cyprus dispute was desirable, it was not a requirement for the accession of Cyprus to the European Union, though in making its decision the Council would 'take into account all relevant factors'" (para. 9(b).

Turkey clearly has a responsibility to be flexible and accommodating in its Cyprus policy, despite Ankara's view that Greek Cypriot accession would be illegal under the 1960 Treaties, but there is also some pressure on the Greek Cypriots. What might be a relevant factor to be considered when accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus is by no means clear, but it seems to imply that some flexibility has to be shown by the Greek Cypriot side. They also have to bear in mind that all fifteen EU members have to approve the accession of the Republic of Cyprus. So there seems to be pressure on both sides for a display of flexibility.

UN Negotiations 1997-2000

The latest talks between the two sides of which we have any extensive information were those held in Troutbeck, New York, and later in Glion, Switzerland, in 1997. The present series of proximity talks is exploratory, with an embargo placed on disclosure by either side of what has been said. To date there have been two rounds of talks, one in New York in December 1999, the second in Geneva, which began at the end of January 2000.

In the July 1997 talks in Troutbeck the differences between the two sides quickly surfaced. The Greek Cypriots could not accept that sovereignty in the proposed federation 'emanated equally from both sides', as described in the first Draft Joint Statement advanced by the UN Secretary General.'" In the Greek Cypriot view sovereignty should be said to be located in the single Cypriot people. Also, in their view, the talks concentrated on constitutional matters instead of concentrating on the issues of the return of the refugees of 1974, the removal of Turkish troops, freedom for any Cypriot to travel, to live and to own property anywhere on the island, and the return of Turkish immigrants to the mainland. The talks were concluded prematurely when the Turkish Cypriots learned that EU accession negotiations were going to begin with the EU, settlement on the island or not.
After these talks Denktas made it absolutely clear that Turkish Cypriot sovereignty had to be recognised as a starting point for future talks. Ankara showed its solid support for Denktas by signing a Turkey-TRNC Joint Statement that emphasised the special relationship between the two states. The Greek Cypriot leader, derides, regarded this new accord as 'irresponsible' It was not a good omen for the Glion, Switzerland, talks in prospect. Denktas said that he would only attend in order to explain that he could not participate in the face oftheEU's intention to proceed with accession negotiations with the South. In a second Draft Joint Declaration that the UN hoped to have signed by each side the expression 'sovereignty emanates equally from both communities' was dropped, sovereignty being described as 'indivisible', presumably to mollify the Greek Cypriot side. This second document also stated that the Federal Republic to be established should adhere strictly to international instruments regarding human rights, thus implying that the Turkish Cypriot refusal to allow Greek Cypriot 'refugees' of 1974 to return to their former properties was an infringement of their rights. Also the second UN document stated that 'all powers not vested by the constitution (my italics) in the federal government shall be reserved to the two federal states'. This might seem innocuous, but not to the Turkish Cypriots. In the New York UN Draft Statement the form was: 'all powers not vested by them [the constituent communities] in the federal government shall rest with the two federal states'. It was held by the Turkish Cypriot side that the later document was again a denial of the sovereignty of each community.

Clerides was prepared to sign this second document, but Denktas was not, as Clerides was no doubt aware. The UN Security Council subsequently condemned the Turkish Cypriot side for trying to bring preconditions to the negotiating table, i.e. their demand for recognition of their sovereignty. In reply the Turkish Cypriot s pointed out that the real precondition brought to the talks between allegedly equal communities was the recognition of the Greek Cypriot Government as the government of the whole of Cyprus.

In the course of the recent talks in December 1999 and January-February 2000, to which reference was earlier made, Clerides claimed that Denktas had accused him of denying even the principle of bi-zonality and had added that he would not discuss territory, boundaries and such matters until after the sovereign rights of the TRNC were recognised. Denktas had also stated, it was claimed, that the Security Council had endorsed a global exchange of property as contained in the 1992 Set of Ideas lv Clerides, therefore, felt he had reason to break the embargo on disclosure of the substance of the proximity negotiations, which were at that time exploratory, in order to make his position clear. The statement includes an outline of the Greek Cypriot position as explained on 31 January 2000.

Statement by Mr Glafcos Clerides (extracts)

On 7 December 1999 at the meeting chaired by Mr Alvaro de Soto I stated the following: 'As you know, Cyprus was a British colony. During the colonial rule neither the Greek Cypriot nor the Turkish Cypriot community had sovereignty. The sovereignty vested in Britain. When independence came, the British sovereignty, with the exception of the two Sovereign Base Areas, devolved on the Republic of Cyprus. What we are trying to do is not to create a new state but an amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus from a unitary to a federal state. What Mr Denktas proposes is tantamount to the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus and the creation of two new states which also involves the non-existence of the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance'.
On 31 January at the commencement of this round of proximity talks I made the following statement:
'The Greek Cypriot side would like to clarify that the proposals or ideas which have been made/or submitted or will be made or submitted by it in its effort to achieve a settlement on the Cyprus problem have been and will be subject to the following general principles:
(i)The object of the negotiations is not to create a new State of Cyprus but to amend the existing Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.
(ii) The settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded and comprising two politically equal communities as defined in Paragraph 11 of the Secretary General's Report (S/27780) in a bi-communal and bizonal federation and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession. Consequently confederation is excluded and cannot be accepted.
(iii)Fundamental human rights as recognised and protected b y the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, the UN Bill of Rights and other international instruments and conventions binding of the Republic of Cyprus should be safeguarded and respected.
(iv) In view of our application to join the European Union the new constitution must be compatible with the acquis communautaire nor should it contain provisions which will prevent effective implementations of decisions on the European Union Executive or Legislative (sic).
(v) On 1 February I wrote a letter to His Excellency the Secretary-General reiterating my above two statements and concluding as follows: 'Finally I wish to make it absolute (sic) clear that as far as we are concerned the question of sovereignty is not a negotiable issue and that is made clear by my two statements to which I referred. 'v

The reply by Denktas, as the following extracts show, refutes derides' views and explains in broad outline the Turkish Cypriot approach.

Statement by H.E.Rauf Denktas (extracts)

The contents of the statement [by derides] 'are malicious and calculated to mislead the world. Contrary to his claims, the solution of the Cyprus question was never defined or taken up as a matter of amending a constitution,, which was already violated and abrogated by the Greek Cypriot side as from 1963. The exercise over the years has aimed at a comprehensive settlement to be arrived at through negotiations between the two parties on the basis of equality. The equal parties are the Turkish Cypriot State established by Turkish Cypriots in the North and the Greek Cypriot State in the South, which unfortunately sails under the false title of'the Republic of Cyprus', behind which Mr derides chooses to hide.
Such a settlement requires not only political will but also an agreement on all the core issues. This simple fact alone demonstrates the falsity of Mr derides' claims. It is obvious that the end result of a comprehensive settlement will not be the restoration of the former defunct Republic of Cyprus or its constitution, which has not been implemented for the last 37 years, but the creation of a new partnership which takes into account the experiences of those years and which will not permit a return to the pre-1974 dark period.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus established by the Turkish Cypriot co-founder partner of the former defunct Republic of Cyprus is convinced that this can only be achieved through the creation of a two-state Cyprus confederation, which the right way for uniting a divided island.

From the outset of the proximity talks, and even prior to the talks, everybody concerned knew clearly our position on the Cyprus question and what we have been defending over the years. In the circumstances created by Mr derides' written statement, I wish to reiterate the following facts:

On the question of sovereignty, Mr derides seems to forget that sovereignty was transferred by Britain to the two co-founder partners with equal rights of self-determination. The main consideration of the Republic was that one party should not dominate the other, let alone one side assuming, by force of arms, the title of the 'Government of Cyprus'. The agreements of 1969-60 had the signatures of five parties, including the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots; on the basis of absolute equality.

Mr Clerides' remarks about the 'realities' of the island are not only totally false, both historically an factually, but are also incompatible with the spirit of the proximity process. Turkey came to Cyprus in order to prevent the wholesale massacre of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots and to prevent the annexation of the island to Greece. His attempt to reverse the facts is yet a further indication of his inability to come to terms with the true facts of the situation.

The mentality displayed by Mr derides at the dawn of a new millennium is, unfortunately, little different than the Greek Cypriot mentality which destroyed the Turkish-Greek partnership state in 1963. As to the sincerity of seemingly favoring a federation, one should recall that all previous efforts to achieve a federal settlement were frustrated by the Greek Cypriot side, and Mr derides has won his Greek Cypriot presidential elections on the basis of his vehement objections to a federal solution. What Mr derides is saying, in effect, is that he has no intention of negotiating in good faith now or in the future and that he does not wish to see a comprehensive settlement. It is obvious that a viable, just and comprehensive settlement cannot be achieved on the basis of such extreme positions.

We hope that only all those trying to help the process but also reasonable Greek Cypriots aware of the facts and what they did to the Turkish Cypriots over the years will encourage Mr derides to change his position and pave the way for a future where the peoples of the two States in Cyprus can agree to unite under a confederal roof.VI

Prospects for a Confederal/ Federal Settlement

A confederation comes into being when two or more autonomous states agree to the joint exercise of power in a number of defined areas of governmental activity, as for instance, in trade, or defence, or health and the environment. When policies are made and decisions are taken jointly in these areas unanimity in the natural rule and secession cannot be prevented. A council composed of representatives of the governments of each state makes the joint decisions, subject to veto by any one state, or by agreement to opting out on particular issues. In a large confederation some majority voting on less important issues might well be accepted. In the final analysis, however, unanimity is crucial. As for the administration of confederal government, some jointly manned central administration might well be necessary, even with branches in the confederated states.

A federation is created when a range of, usually important, functions is given to a central federal institution. Normally the assumption is that sovereignty is also transferred in respect of those functions. The question then arises whether such sovereignty can be reclaimed by any state, or states, composing the federation. It was so claimed by John Calhoun in the United States at the outbreak of the civil war in the nineteenth century, but to no avail. The difficulty is that once a sovereign federal authority is established with major functions it attracts attention from the people as a whole, where in the last resort political sovereignty in democracies is said to lie, and from interest and pressure groups whose natural milieu is the federal state as a whole. Federation-wide voting becomes important, with resultant majority domination. Federated states with markedly different features from the majority (cultural religious, linguistic and so on) may feel overborne and begin to look for secession, as in the case with Quebec in Canada.
Sovereignty is often said in a federation to be divided between state and federal institutions. However, the need that is also felt to allow the constituent states to express views on, and a measure of control over, federal legislation and decisions encourages the representation of the states in, say, an upper house of the legislature and/or in an influential council or cabinet. This creates a composite system that does not turn out to be in operation very different from a unitary liberal and democratic state.v" Sovereignty is then popularly felt to rest somewhere in the galaxy of central federal institutions, though attempts to determine its exact legal location are fraught with difficulties.
However much sovereignty may be seen as 'emanating from' the two communities in Cyprus the Turkish Cypriots are aware that a federation is hazardous for them, especially as they are the smaller of just two communities. It is really too dangerous for them to allow that sovereignty is divisible, let alone 'indivisible', as some UN Security Council Resolutions have gone so far as to assert.

The Turkish Cypriot Confederation Proposal

The first difficulty with any proposal that is called 'confederal' is that it is immediately rejected by the Greek Cypriots, as is apparent in the statement made by derides, above. The Turkish Cypriot proposal for a confederation has also been rejected by the UN Security Council. The Greek Cypriots believe that it is either a ploy to stop negotiations or that once recognised by the South the TRNC would find a pretext to secede and, then join Turkey. In fact a poll in the North show that very few Turkish Cypriots wish to join Turkey. The Security Council believes that confederation equals partition and therefore contravenes the 1960 Treaties.
The Turkish Cypriot confederation proposal made by Denktas, with the mil backing of Turkey, on 31 August 1998, is as follows;

Proposal for a Lasting- Solution In Cyprus

As a final effort to achieve a mutually acceptable lasting solution in Cyprus I propose the establishment of the Cyprus Confederation based on the following arrangements:

1. A special relationship between Turkey and the TRNC on the basis of agreements to be concluded.

2. A similar relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration (GCA) on the basis of a symmetrical agreement to be concluded

3. Establishment of a Cyprus Confederation between the TRNC and the GCA.

4. The I960 Guarantee system shall continue.

5. The Cyprus Confederation may. if the parties jointly agree, pursue a policy of accession to the EU. Until Turkey's full membership of the EU. a special arrangement will provide Turkey with the full rights and obligations of an EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation

The ultimate aim of (lie negotiations will thus be a partnership settlement which will be a confederated structure composed of two peoples and of two states oftlie Island supported by symmetrical agreements with the two respective Motherlands and Guarantor States. All rights and powers which are not referred to the confederal entity will reside with the (wo confederated states. Am agreement to be reached as a result of the negotiations will be submitted for approval in separate referenda,

By participating in (licsc negotiations the parties will acknowledge that the Greek and Turkish sides are two sovereign and equal slates, each with its own functioning democratic institutions and jurisdiction, reflecting the political equality and will of their respective peoples. They will also acknowledge that the authorities of one party do not represent (lie other.

We believe that only this structure

(a) will provide for llie security of both sides.

(b) will safeguard their identity and well-being.

If the Greek Cypriots agree to this final basis, we are ready to begin negotiations to establish the Cyprus Confederation.

Could Confederation be the Solution?

Any acceptance of the idea would have to begin with a recognition by the Greek Cypriots of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which on the face of it seems very unlikely indeed. It would mean the withdrawal of their claims to sovereignty over the North, as the Irish parliament has done with regard to Northern Ireland. This might well be politically impossible for the present range of Greek Cypriot leaders, they have used the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property ownership, the evacuation of Turkish troops and the return of Turkish immigrants to Turkey as rallying cries in elections. Compromise now would be seen as capitulation.

Yet to look at the issue rationally, the Greek Cypriots could do a favourable deal, one that may well never occur again. Four retired Greek ambassadors argued a few years ago that radical measures were needed. They argued for a separate Turkish Cypriot state with, or without, territorial concessions. This would establish an international border which, by its very nature, would be difficult and dangerous for Turkey or the TRNC to violate. This would give a measure of security to the Greek Cypriots, who ever seem convinced, or are easily persuaded, that a Turkish invasion of their territory is a real and present danger. If, in addition, the Greek Cypriots joined the EU, their border would ipso facto be virtually guaranteed. After a proper separation inter-Cypriot co-operation and association would become possible, in the view of the four ambassadors. The result of this sort of settlement would be to remove a major cause for war between Greece and Turkey. The ambassadors dismissed UN attempts to create a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation as unrealistic, and likely to lead to Turkish control of the whole island. This reflects a range of quite powerful sentiment in the South that a federation would work against them. Certainly a federation that formed part of the EU might well create a problem for the South of immigration from Turkey if and when Turkey became a member of the European Union.

The ideas were not new, but it was interesting that the argument on them took place in the mainstream Greek media. The ideas were vigorously refuted by the Greek Government, in particular by the Greek Foreign Minister. In his reply he said, 'The division of Cyprus, the creation of two independent states, or double enosis, (which are both varieties of partition) would serve nobody's interest, and would constitute a permanent confrontation line for Greece and Turkey, and a permanent threat to peace and stability in the wider region'.v1" This was only to refute the ambassadors' views by contradiction, not by argument. It is a little difficult to understand since the boundary in Thrace causes few problems.
The weak point in the ambassadors' views is surely their neglect of the possibility of bargaining Greek Cypriot recognition of the TRNC against the return of some territory and the limited return of displaced Greek Cypriots to the TRNC. When faced with the prospect of living under Turkish Cypriot rule not many Greek Cypriots might wish to return.'" Moreover the global exchange of properties might well be what is really desired. These are 'considerations which are rehearsed by the Greek Cypriots in private, but almost never in public'.x In short a win-win negotiation would seem to be possible and might well clear a way for governmental co-operation.

In his recent statement, given above, derides claims that the 1960 Constitution established a unitary state. The Constitution stated that the Republic of Cyprus was sovereign, but then divided that sovereignty, in effect, between the two communities. Essentially the 1960 Constitution established a confederal or partnership arrangement by giving veto powers to each community in crucial areas of legislation and decision-making. Unanimity was the rule. The Turkish Cypriots accepted a renewal of this arrangement under the title of 'federation' in the UN proposals made over the years including in the Set of Ideas advanced and approved by the UN Security Council in 1992. The Greek Cypriots, who have not actually accepted these UN draft arrangements did not specifically object to the repetition of these sorts of arrangements. In 1992, for instance, Vassiliou said that the Set of Ideas could form the basis for discussion, not negotiation. Later, however, both Vassiliou and derides, who replaced him as president, came out against the inclusion of veto powers over major decisions of the council of ministers and the legislature."' derides' intentions in amending the 1960 Constitution would doubtless be directed towards making it a composite federation, the normal type of federation, with a place for popularly based sovereign federal institutions.

Conclusions

It is very difficult to see any rapprochement in these constitutional matters, the differences of principle are too apparent for the lines to be blurred. These differences underline the fact that this is not truly speaking an ethnic, or even a religious conflict, despite differences of language and religion, but essentially a political conflict. There probably has never been a Cypriot consciousness: Turkish and Greek Cypriots did not inter-relate closely, but they managed to get along over the years. It was essentially the demand for enosis, union with the Hellenic world, and the Turkish counter-cry oftaksim (partition) that set them at loggerheads. It led to assertion of the right to self-determination by both sides, but for the Greek Cypriots the locus for assertion of self-determination was the whole of Cyprus, thus including the Turkish Cypriots. The latter in consequence proclaimed their own right to self-determination. The Greek Cypriots believe that since they constitute a large majority on the island, established there for many centuries, they have a right to rule over all Cyprus, whilst according the Turkish Cypriot 'minority' appropriate minority rights. The Turkish Cypriots, whose Turkish forbears colonised the island in 1571, freeing the Greek Cypriots from the Venetian yoke, ruled it thereafter. They, too, have a long established stake in Cyprus and cannot be dismissed as '400 year visitors'. They too claim the right of self-determination, which lies at the heart of liberal democracy and which is very difficult to deny, however politically disruptive it may be in some parts of the world. If Kosovo and East Timor, they ask, why not Northern Cyprus? This is what lies at the heart of the Cyprus conflict, nullifying so far attempts to unite the two sides politically.

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Footnotes:

• ' See my The Cyprus Imbroglio, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1998, for the 'European Observer's Report on Cyprus', 23 Jan. 1995, pp. 172-80.
• 'ii It is not clear what is the import of this statement, nor of the use of 'Cyprus', instead of the 'Republic of Cyprus'.
• " This was the formula proposed by the UN Secretary General in the 1992 Set of Ideas proposals. At that time the Greek Cypriot side did not make any detailed response on this issue, but had the talks continued, would no
  doubt have done so.
• " Article 77 of the 1992 Set of Ideas reads: 'The ownership of property of displaced persons, in respect of those who seek compensation, will be transferred to the ownership of the community in which the property is located.To this end, all titles of properties will be exchanged on a global basis.' However, this did not deny the right of owners to return to their property (Article 79).
• " Statement by the President of the Republic, Mr Glafcos derides, 2 Feb. 2000.
• " Statement by H.E. RaufDenktas, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 3 Feb., 2000. The response on the subject of property exchange has been omitted, as has the first introductory paragraph.
• " For a conceptual analysis of federations see in particular, Preston King, Federalism and Federation, Baltimore and London, 1982, where he states, 'the basic principle understood in confederations is that the
  centre is not sovereign', p. 133. For a fuller analysis than is possible in this paper see my 'Confederation, Federation ad Sovereignty: Theory and Practice' Perceptions, Vol.14, No.3, Sep-Nov. 1999, 23-38.
• viii The four ambassadors' views 'Reflections and Considerations on our Foreign Policy' Athens 1995. are given by Sergios Zambouras, 'Current Greek Attitudes and Policy' in Clement Dodd (ed). Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives, The Eothen Press, Huntingdon, 1999.
• For the quotation from the Foreign Minister's reply see ibid. p. 119.
• ix As argued by Zenon Stavrinides, 'Greek Cypriot Perceptions', in Dodd (ed) Cyprus. The Need/or New Perspectives, pp. 88-9.
• "Ibid. xi Suha Boliikbasi. 'Boutros-Ghali's Initiative in 1992:Why Did it Fail?'. Middle Eastern Studies. .Vol.31. No.3. July 1995, 478.