M. Ergun OLGUN
Adjunct Professor of International Negotiation, Department of Internationbal Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University (DAU), Gazimagosa, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Under-Secretary to the President of the Republic
My presentation will aim at providing answers to how we can move forward from where we are today. It is very interesting that we have a good amount of convergence among the points that have been raised here and that is very encouraging. Some of the things I will be proposing later on, after my few observations to start with, have a lot in common with what has already been said. What has been said so far has been, tremendous contribution towards the practical things that need to be done and maybe in terms of perspectives for the future that we could benefit from. I happen to be both a practioner and also an academic on the subject under discussion. Some people criticize me for being a bit academic about my approaches but I think this is rather a compliment.
Few observations before sharing with you my ideas on how we can move forward from the point we are at this juncture. Very interestingly, the current agenda of the United Nations in inviting the parties for proximity talks is to prepare the ground for negotiations. And that is very interesting because this is exactly what Professor Mango has been talking about: preparing the ground for negotiations and for resolution in Cyprus. So the need has already been felt that we cannot just, all of a sudden, because people want from outside, create miracles in Cyprus. There is need for a process for preparation for an interim period, for a transitional period. Since this issue has also been raised by the UN, I think we need to explore a bit more what is meant, what do we mean and understand by preparing the ground for meaningful negotiations for resolution.
What does it involve? We believe it involves two main things: one is the structural issue; the other one is the behavioral issue. In the structural issues, naturally, we are referring to political structure and the need to level the political playing field in Cyprus: the status of the two parties. If the objective is the establishment of a new relationship that is going to be equal in political terms then invariably we need equality in Cyprus. Thus, the political playing field needs to be leveled and in preparing the ground, this is the major issue that needs to be addressed. The second, naturally, is the behavioral dimension, the psychological issues involved in Cyprus. The amount of mistrust in the Island, the deep crisis of confidence that exists. This needs to be addressed and this cannot be addressed, if for example, one party claims that it represents the whole island including the Turkish Cypriots.
Furthermore trust cannot be said to exist if there are 37 years old embargoes on the Turkish Cypriot people including playing football with any international team, including travel, including tourism, communication etc. Any human rights that you can think of are now under an embargo for the Turkish Cypriot people in Cyprus. And this needs to be addressed if we are really concerned in building up the necessary trust and confidence between the two parties of the island.
Ripeness for Resolution
In terms of preparing the ground, there are several models proposed by international experts of conflict resolution. One theory proposed by Professor William Zartman says: If we are going to transform a conflict, we need a situation which he calls, "a mutually hurting stalemate" where all the parties are equally hurt from the existing status quo. If they are not equally hurt and one of them benefits from the existing status quo then the dynamics for change cannot be said to exist.
Unfortunately in Cyprus we do not yet have a situation of mutually hurting stalemate because one of the parties in Cyprus has all the political and economical advantages over the other, depriving the other party from those economic and political advantages thus benefiting from the status quo. In fact any change in the status quo would mean that the Turkish Cypriot party would acquire "things" that would mean the end of the monopoly that the Greek Cypriot party has been exercising since 1963. So at this point in time it cannot be said that there is a situation where there is equal political and economic hurt on the parties.
The other concept produced by Professor Joseph Montville is the concept of ripeness for resolution. This idea suggests that unless there is some kind of parity in the motivation and structural equality in the relationship, unless, there is some alignment in the dynamics of the peoples, the party that feels deprived does not have the confidence to engage in a new relationship with the other party. It would not be ready to expose itself to a new exercise, to a new partnership game with the other party. So you have one party behaving in a reactionary manner, in a very defensive manner. The suggestion is thus that there is need for some kind of balance in motivational, political and economic terms so that the dynamics can be said to exist for change to come. This doesn't exist in Cyprus either.
Outside Cyprus, yes, the forces are more conducive for change in the Island. The European Union is a magnetic pole for both peoples on the island. It has been a magnetic pole for both Greece and Turkey as well. Greece is already a member;
Turkey wants to be a member. So, that magnetic pole does provide some kind of incentive that could at a certain point in time be utilized. Turkish and Greek rapprochement, although we do not know how deep it is at this point in time, is a positive development, which adds momentum as an outside factor for a resolution.
These are some important factors, but on the Island itself, when we look at what is happening today, we see that all conservative elements in the Greek Cypriot community, led by the Church and nationalist elements including most of the party leaders, are opposing change. They are only interested in wanting to preserve the monopoly of power of the Greek Cypriot party. This is the biggest obstacle against change in the island and this is something that needs to be addressed if we are to achieve the kind of desired objective that we would like to see.
Another relevant factor is the UN Secretary General's statement of 22nd June 1999. In his 6 monthly report he says that the challenge in Cyprus, for the negotiations, is in translating the commitment for political equality, into clear practical provisions. He in fact means that this political equality is there, but we have not yet been able to translate this into our lives, into practical terms.
This brings us to the subject of preparing the ground for meaningful negotiations and resolution. I don't think that the two peoples of the Island would by themselves be able to make the necessary transformation. For this we would need, unfortunately, outside help.
The international community has allowed for the asymmetry on the Island. The international community has to see to it that this asymmetry now moves towards parity so that we could say that the ground is ready for negotiations and for some kind of a mutually agreed future of the two parties.
Another observation is that, as the distinguished Professors before me have pointed out, the right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people has been acknowledged twice beforehand by the British Parliament. This is before the independence was granted in 1956 and 1958. It was clearly said that the two parties in Cyprus are equally entitled to the right to self-determination.
This was the basis on which the 1960 agreements were made, giving equal political power to both of the parties. We cannot now turn to the Turkish Cypriots, after recognizing their right to separate self-determination and political equality and say to them: "Sorry chaps, you don't have these today".
We cannot expect the Turkish Cypriot people to accept such a thing after successfully fighting the forces of domination from the Greek Cypriot party for 37 years, never giving in, never subjugating themselves to Greek Cypriot domination and after having established their own administration in 1964 and their own state since 1983. In his memoirs.
President derides of the South admits that the Turkish Cypriots established their own administration as soon as, in his words, "the Republic was broken up in 1963". What I fail to understand is this: if a people with the separate right of self-determination, if one of the constituent partners of the 1960 partnership Republic, say to their other partner that they don't represent them, 200.000 of them, through their political institutions and elected representatives, how can it be possible that this other party goes around the world claiming that they represent the whole island.
And how is it possible that the EU, which says that one of its criteria for membership is respect for the principles of democracy, accept the Greek Cypriot application for membership claiming to be on behalf of the whole of Cyprus as a legitimate application fulfilling all the criteria for membership? It surely cannot fulfill the criteria of respect for democratic principles if the Turkish Cypriots say, 200.000 of them, that they don't represent the Turkish Cypriots.
So, these are the kinds of dilemmas that we need answers to, so that we can move forward.
One claim of the Greek Cypriot side is that if the Turkish Cypriots were required to give their consent regarding EU membership, or if the EU were to say that there would have to have an agreement in the Island first, before moving to a joint EU membership, this would mean that the Greek Cypriot side would be hostage of the Turkish Cypriots. This is a regular argument. But what about the Turkish Cypriots being the hostage of the Greek Cypriots for the last 37 years? This is the injustice that needs to be corrected.
Scenarios
Having said all these things, naturally, we need to move forward. It can be said that there are 3 broad options, or 3 different scenarios for Cyprus:
- One, is to keep the status quo as it is today. A potentially explosive situation.
- Two, is to move towards two separate recognized States.
- Three, to work towards the establishment of a link between the two States, the two peoples of the island, through structured mechanisms for their cooperation, including the dimension ofEU membership under one joint representation.
The preferred option of the Turkish Cypriots is the third one, in spite of the difficulties of the Island, and in spite of the fact that they have been kept hostage for 37 years. The reason is clear; cooperation is better than confrontation and because Turkey is moving in the direction of the EU. Greece is already there, we cannot keep ourselves outside this process that is functioning in our region. But at the same time our right to our statehood and the realities of the island need to be taken into account and this brings us to how we can realize the third option. This is going to be the core of the remaining part of my presentation.
What are the avenues that we have ahead of us? What processes or initiatives can we take in order to realize the objective of a freely negotiated and mutually acceptable settlement in the island of Cyprus, facilitating the kinds of linkages both on the Island and with the EU.
The first avenue is the UN process, the good offices mission of the Secretary General. For this process, which is now at the phase of preparing the ground for meaningful negotiations, to move to the next stage of face to face negotiations, which is called meaningful/substantive negotiations, there is need for a few things to be done. One of them is that there has to be a statement, a declaration that neither party in Cyprus can claim to represent or be the Government of the other.
There has to be a declaration to give some life, some understanding, some meaning to the fact that we have two parties on the Island, which will freely negotiate their future at the negotiating table. The other one is for the parties to simultaneously lift any political, economic and social obstacles on the other. Of course this needs to be done mutually, through an agreement. This will build up the needed trust and confidence between the two parties. It is very interesting that the third one that I have here, what I have named 'intergovernmental contacts' between the two parties, is very similar to what Prof. Mango has been saying.
There is need for leadership, for creative action on the part of the international community, including the United Nations, the European Union, and members of the Security Council, at least some of the members of the Security Council. I don't think that Russia is interested in the settlement of the dispute in the Island because it is using the Cyprus conflict as a leverage to promote its own policies in the region.
I'm not sure about Britain as well. I'm sorry there are some British here but because of its military bases on the Island, I don't think that Britain is very much interested in achieving a resolution of the Cypms issue which will bring to the agenda the future of these military bases. But I think the other members of the Security Council, including the United States and France and others, like Germany, need to show if they are really interested in a settlement.
If they are interested in Eastern Mediterranean security and stability, if they are interested in the enlargement process of the EU and the massive economic and political potential interests in the region, which extends into the Caucasus, into the Middle East into the Balkans, then they have to be proactive. In order to have those linkages as opportunities, I think we need to resolve the Cyprus issue and give momentum to the moves of rapprochement in the region and integration with the EU. So, there are enough incentives on key players of the international community to try to work towards preparing the ground for resolution on the issues 1 have pointed out.
To carry us forward, the Turkish Cypriot proposal is a confederal model because a confederal model addresses the reality that there are two sovereign states on the Island. It satisfies the aspirations of the two sides to be sovereign in themselves. At the same time, it provides for the mechanisms to link the two peoples and states of the Island, on agreed powers and functions. It provides for, on issues that they will agree, a joint representation, including the EU and of course the UN, and other issues they may take up. At the same time it will provide the opportunity for the states, the constituent states, if they wish, to establish their own ties with other countries and other institutions around the world.
If for example, the Turkish Cypriot State wants to maintain special relations with Turkey, it would have a chance under a confederal model to be able to do that. Same will apply to Greek Cypriots and Greece. This is no exception because it is already the case in the example of the Republika Srpska. According to the Dayton Agreement, the Republika Srpska can independently have international contacts of its own with Serbia and other countries. Confederations do provide for this possibility and there are other benefits, if we have time we can look into them. And what kind of mechanisms and institutions can we model or think of for confederal arrangements? We can talk about that if you wish in the questions section.
But I would like to move to the second avenue, which is the interim phase, which has been elaborately taken up by other speakers before me. The interim period, which is the transitional period which has to start today, will in a way, mean proactive action on the part of the two peoples of the Island.
Proactive action is necessary to prepare for the future for a sustainable settlement of the Cyprus issue. We need to build institutions, which will facilitate the two peoples and two states of the Island, to work together and this is a pressing need. We have common environmental problems, we have problems of water, we have problems of health on the Island. It is essential that the two states of the Island through their departments come together and discuss these issues.
They can initially use the facilitation of a third party to start the process. There are fires along the border in Cyprus and we don't have the coordination mechanism to deal with them. Fires jump to the other side. Things like pest management are all transborder questions and we need to cooperate on these. There is need for this not only because of the physical necessity but because we need to build our culture of cooperation.
We also need to start removing the obstacles on each other, including trade between ourselves and sports and other things, not only on the Island but off the island as well. We need to deal with the issue of embargoes urgently. We need to build up the needed trust and confidence. We need to supplement intergovernmental contacts with the contacts ofNGO's. But these need to be tackled up in a comprehensive way and not in a selective way. We cannot say, "Oh, I like this one, that's people to people, let's forget about the rest", which is what the Greek Cypriot side is currently proposing. The people to people avenue has been exploited against us in the past. So, we need to move to this process with elements that will give confidence to both sides.
The third avenue is the EU and if we are really aiming at a membership of "Cyprus" in quotation, the Island of Cyprus comprising both parties, this can sensibly only follow a settlement of the Cyprus issue. If it precedes a settlement this would be a catastrophy. Many of the negative results that this could lead to, have already been pointed out by previous speakers.
For a starter it would naturally end the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. Unilateral membership of the Greek Cypriot side, would bring Turkey and the EU into direct confrontation. It would result in less European security. It would mean that we would have weakened the NATO alliance. It would mean that we have problems of security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. European economic interests vis-a-vis Turkey would be threatened. All our strategic interests, everybody's strategic interests will be challenged. It is a "no win" situation to move in that direction.
The win-win situation would be, the achieving a settlement first and then moving towards a confederal or a joint membership of the EU.
There are tremendous benefits for everybody in this, including Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots cannot now trade with Turkey. Turkey is one of the largest trading partners of the region. With 65 millions people it is the largest emerging market of the area. Tourism, banking, shipping are some of the potential activities that Greek Cypriots could benefit from. Membership of the EU is not going to bring any direct economic benefits to the Greek Cypriots, in fact they will be losing in some activities including their shipping and the offshore activities they are involved in. But a resolution of the Cyprus issue will bring them direct benefits in terms of new markets in Turkey and I am sure that there will be lots of tourists coming to the Island. There could be lots of trade between a confederal Cyprus and Turkey.
There will be political and economic benefits for the Turkish Cypriots as well. So the win-win development would be the achievement of a resolution first, on the basis of the realities that exist on the Island today, and a joint move towards EU membership. But what we see today is unfortunately a process that has proven to be destructive and that needs to change whereby the Greek Cypriot side is not seen as the sole interlocutor acting on behalf of the Island. The continuation of the current failure strategy should not be allowed. The new perspectives that we are talking about requires such a change.
The EU has to review its perception regarding Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot side has shown signs that it is interested in moving towards direct dialogue with the EU, naturally not linked to the South. Turkish Cypriots laugh at the Greek Cypriot offer to join their negotiation team. As what? As the "political obscurity" in Cyprus? So, the Turkish Cypriots, again in a proactive manner, have now been in touch with EU institutions and have offered to them that they are interested in establishing their own channel of dialogue with the EU, and we hope that EU member countries will have the foresight. Creative ideas are needed.
The nation state system was born in Europe but Europe is now at the cutting edge of developing confederal arrangements to link states. We need to link the two states of the island of Cyprus in the same manner. The TRNC is not an end in itself for the Turkish Cypriots.
The TRNC was created in self defense and will today satisfy Turkish Cypriot aspirations in achieving the needed parity with the Greek Cypriot people. Beyond the parity is the needed linking. The opportunity needs to be grasped. Nobody can today, in view of larger interests allow the petty obsessions of domination to prevent the linking of the two states of the island. I think it is time for both Europe and the Greek South to move beyond obsessions and look for larger benefits to be accrued to all, based on the spirit of parity and partnership between the two peoples of the island.
The Turkish Cypriot side has taken a step forward and we look forward to the step that will be taken by the Greek Cypriot side-of course a substantive step in the right direction.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I wish to explain somewhat in detail, our confederation proposal.
Why Confederation for Cyprus
Encyclopedia Britannica describes confederations as "voluntary associations of independent states that, to ensure some common purpose, agree to certain limitations on their freedom of action and establish some joint machinery of consultation or deliberation. The limitations on the freedom of action of the member states may be as trivial as an acknowledgement of their duty to consult with each other before taking some independent action or as significant as the obligation to be bound by majority decisions of the member states".
There exists in Cyprus two equal and sovereign peoples and their respective democratic states. The relationship of the two peoples has for the last 36 years been one of confrontation that needs to be transformed into one of cooperation. No doubt, such transformation and accommodation has to be based on a freely negotiated and mutually acceptable agreement, and the political will and consent of the two peoples. Both peoples must feel that their concerns are equally valued and that the arrangements and institutions under an agreement will fully respect and protect their interests, rights and distinct identities.
Confederations enable peoples to preserve their separate national identity, existence and political sovereignty while allowing them to build a working cooperative relationship based on the joint exercise, of certain agreed powers and functions on matters considered to be confederal by the founding agreement of the confederation. It also allows the constituent states to continue to be subjects of international law on agreed powers and functions.
According to Professor Daniel J. Elazar "confederation and confederal arrangements are being revived as the postmodern form of federalism that seems to be particularly useful in connecting politically sovereign states that must accommodate themselves to the realities of new times. These include the growing inter dependence among states deemed politically sovereign, the desire/or linkage among states and peoples that will not require them to merge into new nations but enable them to preserve their separate national identities and existence, and recognition of the realities of ethnic distinctiveness and, at times, conflict". (1)
This revival perfectly matches the needs and challenges of postmodern Cyprus, especially after the unsuccessful partnership experience of the 1960-1963 period and what followed. A confederal arrangement can provide both for a politically secure basis, and the structure and norms for initiating a new and evolving cooperative relationship between the two equal and sovereign parties in Cyprus.
Confederations have a life of their own and their "evolutionary" nature needs to be bourn in mind. Historically confederations have proven to be a first step towards the establishment of what may be called federal unions. To give a few examples, the federal union of modern Switzerland was preceded by a confederation of the Swiss cantons; Germany's modern federal arrangements may be traced to the German confederation of the 19th Century (the Deutsche Bund); and the federal constitution of the United States is the successor to the government of the Articles of Confederation (1781-89). The Articles established a Congress of the confederation as a unicameral assembly of ambassadors from the 13 states, the powers of which were in fact dependent for their enforcement upon the states. The Articles summarised the arrangement as "each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled".
Some Reasons Why a Confederal Arrangement could address the needs and challenges of Postmodern Cyprus
Cyprus is in the midst of a paradigm shift where statehood is no more an end but rather the means to a new world of interstate integration of a confederal character. The EU is emerging as the worlds largest and most articulate confederation covering a large region. Both parties in Cyprus vision to become members (or a member if a Cyprus confederation is established) of the EU.
In spite of the paradigm shift, and in spite of the strong magnetic pull of the EU, the two equal co-owners of Cyprus have unfortunately not even started their own mini journey of "island-wide" confederalism. A confederal arrangement between the two parties could provide for the satisfaction of the following needs and interests;
1. Both parties in Cyprus attach primary importance to their separate national identities, existence and respective democratic states.
Confederations unite states without depriving them of their statehood. States retain their territorial sovereignty but agree to restrictions on their independence.
2. Structural equality and symmetry are the essential ingredients in translating political equality into practical provisions. Since the sovereignty and independence of a Greek Cypriot state is recognised and respected, political equality and symmetry invariably necessitate the parallel treatment of the Turkish Cypriot state.
Confederal arrangements between sovereign and constitutionally independent states provide the best model for partnership, because such arrangements do not deprive any party from the satisfaction and safety of its sovereign equality and statehood, while providing for the needed symmetry and parity.
3. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is predominately Turkish Cypriot, Turkish speaking and secular Muslim. The Greek Cypriot south is predominately Greek Cypriot. Greek speaking and Orthodox Christian.
Confederations apply best in situations where the populations are too heterogeneous to form viable federal-type unions. Primary loyalty in confederations is oriented toward the constituent states.
4. The island of Cyprus is the common home of both the Turkish Cypriot people and the Greek Cypriot people. Neither of these two peoples would accept to be dominated or governed by the other. Yet, the two peoples are destined to share the island, to co-exist and to work together for a better future, stability and quality of life.
Confederations presuppose an overriding need such as powerful common practical, political or security interests.
5. There is minimal trust and cooperation between the two parties in Cyprus.
Confederations operate with a modest mandate that leaves most governmental powers to be exercised independently by its member states.
6. The conflict in Cyprus threatens the strategic, security and economic interests of both parties in the island, of their respective motherlands Turkey and Greece, of the EU, and of Transatlantic interest in general.
The re-establishment of the balance of power on the island through a confederal arrangement based on the sovereign equality and statehood of the two parties will provide for island-wide and regional security and stability.
7. Although the primary loyalty of the two peoples of the island is to their respective state, there is a growing awareness amongst the populace of both states that there is need to coexist on the island as good neighbours.
Confederations require popular support among the peoples of the constituent states based on the belief that such an arrangement will enhance their security and well-being.
8. Both states in Cyprus wish to be members of the European Union.
A confederal arrangement can provide the mechanisms and the common roof which, in turn, can facilitate joint membership of the EU.
Confederal Mechanisms
To meet the above needs, some of the mechanisms, institutions and norms offered by confederal arrangements are:
1. Member states settle their differences through negotiation, arbitration or adjudication.
2. A joint council is formed composed of specified state representatives (for example Presidents and Foreign Ministers) who meet regularly and operate under mutually agreed rules of procedure.
3. Member states transfer powers on specified functions to the confederal centre but do not necessarily transfer any part of their sovereignty.
4. State representatives deliberate and vote on behalf of their state.
5. Decision making in the council is based on unanimity and is legally binding on the member states.
6. The decision implementation system usually delegates the major burden of implementation to the governments of member states.
7. There is need for readiness on the part of the member states to furnish the necessary funds to enable the confederation to carry out the tasks assigned to it.
8. Executive and judicial functions assigned to the confederation have to be carried out in ways that are unthreatening to the sovereignty of its member states.
9. Confederations are sensitive to, and develop mutually acceptable working solutions to problems and risks of domination that may emanate from inequalities of power and resources among its larger and smaller member states.
Confederation and Federation
In situations where separate national loyalties are under threat, the emphasis is on collective rights and liberties. Americans have a very difficult time in understanding issues of collective rights because immigrants from different nationalities chose to put aside their past and join the new common venture which America was.(l) This made American pluralism almost exclusively individualistic in character. In the case of Cyprus, where there is no Cypriot nation and where there is a history of rivalry and conflict between the two peoples and their motherlands Turkey and Greece, national rights are of primary importance. Professor Daniel J. Elazar points out to four reasons why confederations, as opposed to federations, suit situations where collective or national rights are of more importance. (3)
1. In federations, the federal government can reach out directly to its citizenry as well as ^ through the constituent polities. This is not satisfactory when national rights are at stake. In a confederation, the confederal government must reach individual citizens only through the constituent polities.
2. A federation is more concerned with the preservation of individual liberty, while a confederation places greater emphasis on the preservation of the local liberties of its constituent polities.
3. Federations have a common law of some scope that is enforceable throughout the federation, while confederations tend to leave matters of law to the constituent polities except as explicitly provided in limited areas determined to be of such general concern that they must be governed by a common law:
4. As a general rule confederations have more limited ends than federations.
More specifically, additional reasons why the confederal model better suits the requirements of Cyprus are:
1. Federations ordinarily serve single nations where the federal government has direct contact with the people. Confederations provide for the linking of different national states where the confederation must reach the peoples of the -constituent states through the governments of those states. There are two distinct peoples in Cyprus.
2. Federations ordinarily aim at nation - building while confederations aim at connecting politically sovereign states. Thus single citizenship is usually not the norm in confederations. The challenge in Cyprus is to connect two politically sovereign states.
3. In federations all the regimes must be similar in form. Confederations can have a greater range of regime forms among their constituent states.
The existing regime forms of the two parties in Cyprus are different.
4. Confederations have a higher degree of independent access to the international arena.
It is highly likely that both parties in Cyprus will want to maintain a high degree of independent access to the international arena if they managed to establish a confederation.
5. In federations territorial sovereignty is shared or, sometimes, transferred to the federation. In confederations constituent states retain their sovereignty.
Both parties in Cyprus are very jealous of their respective sovereignty.
6. Confederations are formed by agreement or treaty between constituting states, and the agreement or treaty becomes their basic document. The basic legal document of federations is a constitution.
The Turkish Cypriot people do not want to engage in another constitutional exercise with their former partner and risk yet another forced expulsion and isolation.
Professor Clement Dodd points out that in federal states central institutions come to rely more and more on popular support. He writes that "federal institutions tend to create and develop large pressure and interest groups and, even more significantly, to exert democratic pressures on central institutions through the ballot box. The result is that political institutions at the centre begin to develop more responsiveness to the electorate as a whole". (1) This leads to a tendency of the federal state steadily reducing the powers of federated states. Once the federal authorities develop the support of a strong majority through the federation, it is not easy to accept a good deal of regional independence. He warns that in a bi-communal federation, where one of the communities is numerically smaller and economically weaker, this problem can become particularly accute. He thus suggests a confederal arrangement for Cyprus where there is no confederal assembly, but where there could be confederal governmental institutions, ideally starting with a modest range of functions, composed of members' of the governments of each state.
Especially after the unlawful and unilateral application of the Greek Cypriot parly for EU membership, claiming to represent the whole island, a federal settlement comprising single sovereignty, one territory and one people (single citizenship) has become an anachronism totally removed from the political realities of the island and no more sufficient in satisfying the basic needs and interests of the Turkish Cypriot people. The continuing threat of domination by the Greek Cypriot party has made territorial sovereignty a vital pillar of Turkish Cypriot security together with the guarantee provided by Turkey under the 1960 Guarantee System. A confederal set up is thus seen by the Turkish Cypriot people as the best model for linking the states and peoples of the island.
Conclusion
In broad terms the conflict in Cyprus can be resolved in one of two ways: recognition of the two parties as two separate states(2), or guaranteeing the integrity and sovereignty of each party while providing for a mechanism that links them. So far; the international community has preferred the second option. Although desirable, the second option is difficult at the time of conflict when there is no trust and confidence between the parties, no perceived common interests, and when the conflicting parties are most highly inflamed and protective of their self-interest. But the conflict in
Cyprus is more broad-based than Cyprus itself. There are other parties and multi-faced interests involved like those of motherlands Turkey and Greece, the European Union; the USA and others. Security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean is of vital importance for the EU and USA interests. It is primarily because of this exogenous need that the second option becames a necessity for Cyprus. In addition, Cyprus finds itself in a region which is moving towards an arrangement of sharing- and integrating - the European Union. The two parties of the island can not stay out of this sharing in the interests of their self-preservation, thus the irreversible need to resolve their differences.
Bearing in mind that the challenge in Cyprus is not nation-building but the connecting of two sovereign states, the question is how the needs for guaranteeing the integrity and sovereignty of each party, as well as the needs for linking the two states of Cyprus and of eventual EU membership, can be satisfied under one formula. How can the reality of national aspirations of the two parties in Cyprus be accommodated with the realities and the necessities for interdependence?
A confederal arrangement offers the best formula with the possibility of a partnership and sharing through a confederal agreement while, at the same time, satisfying the need for political sovereignty and statehood.
Although the state system was born in Europe, today Europe is at the cutting edge of developing new post-modern political arrangements. The call is not rejecting the state system but building on it. Confederalism, subsidiarity and intrastate devolution are key phenomenon underlying new political arrangements. The European Union is leading in the revival of confederation; a form of federalism that was thought to be dead and unworkable.
The two parties in Cyprus have to learn from the lessons of Europe. In periods of stability and calm the law may shape reality, but in periods of change, which Cyprus is going through, the law will have to follow reality and find ways to accommodate and justify it. The reality of two sovereign states in Cyprus can be accommodated and justified through the establishment of a Cyprus confederation. This could facilitate island-wide linking as well as linking with the EU.
Sovereignty will rest with the two member states, without prejudice to the competences and the defined international personality that is assigned to the confederation by the confederation agreement. While the Cyprus confederation will have international legal personality for specified purposes (like EU membership) to be agreed upon by the two member states, the member states will themselves have international legal personality in matters for which they are competent.
Because both parties in Cyprus define themselves in terms of wider identities and allegiances, it is necessary that the respective motherlands of the two parties also play equally positive and constructive roles in creating the conditions which would facilitate the establishment of a confederal arrangement between them. In line with the 1960 Agreements, the maintenance of the balance of links between the two guarantor motherlands vis-a-vis "Cyprus" could provide both the basis and the needed confidence for Turkey and Greece to play such a positive and constructive role. The beneficiaries will be the two parties, Turkey and Greece, and, in general, regional security and stability. EU needs for security and enlargement will be served - a win-win for all.
The creative and forward-looking confederation proposal of the Turkish Cypriot party of 31st August 1998 provides a unique and all-encompassing opportunity for Cyprus and the region.
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(1) Daniel J. Elazar, The Postmodern Revival of Confederal Arrangements, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, p.40 1
(2) Jean Blondel, Comparative Government; Prentice Hall, 1995, p.244.
(3) Elazar, op. pp. 74-75 d
(4) Clement H. Dodd, "Confederation, Federation and Sovereignty: Theory and Practice", Perceptions, September-November 1999, Volume IV - Number3, Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, pp. 33-3.4
(5) Please see Michaet Walzer, "Modem Tribalism" Dialogue, 1992, Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas. Inc reprinted with permission from Dissent, 18. 6